Start Here: Origin → Apologia → Introduction → Commentary → CCE Formation → Model Forms

Why Commons Capitalism Took So Long to Emerge

Reference code: C26-01 Most people assume that, if an idea is sound, someone would have built it already. Commons Capitalism invites that assumption because the core concept is simple: keep markets and competition, but forbid private capture of surplus. If that is all it is, why did it not show up decades ago, fully formed, […]

A Keynesian Critique of Commons Capitalism

Reference code: C25-20 Why Keynes Would Pay Attention John Maynard Keynes would not have approached Commons Capitalism as a moral manifesto. He would have approached it as a machine: Does it keep employment high, keep investment steady, and keep the economy from falling into avoidable slumps? From that angle, Commons Capitalism is immediately interesting because […]

Polycentric Governance Tends to Outperform Traditional Capitalist Governance

Reference code: C25-16 The Concentrated-Power Problem in Traditional Capitalism In a conventional capitalist firm, economic authority tends to collapse into a single dominant center even when the org chart looks more complex. Shareholders (or the capital markets that discipline them) set the value target, the board sets the strategic frame, and senior management controls the […]

How Reserves and Funds Protect Workers in a Downturn

Reference code: C25-15 This commentary is one of a two-part set of commentaries that examines  worker precarity in down economies. What “Reserves and Funds” Mean in Practice Reserves and internal funds reduce precarity only when they operate as pre-positioned commitments rather than discretionary gestures. The practical question is not whether the system has money. The […]

Durable Worker Security in Economic Downturns

Reference code: C25-14 This commentary is one of a two-part set of commentaries that examines worker precarity in down economies. Why Downturns Turn Jobs into Precarity Economic downturns translate quickly into worker precarity because the employment relationship in the United States is often the gateway to stability rather than merely a source of wages. The […]

The Problem of Captured Surplus

Why A Commons-Based Enterprise Model Is Needed Now Reference code: C25-13 Historical Drift of the Postwar Social Contract In the decades after the Second World War, households in the United States could reasonably expect that diligent work would translate into stability, modest upward mobility and some measure of shared prosperity. Productivity growth, wage growth and […]

Projected Reach of Commons Enterprises in the United States

Reference code: C25-12 Recent data from the Federal Reserve and related analyses show just how concentrated wealth has become in the United States. The Federal Reserve’s Distributional Financial Accounts, summarized in a June 2025 article from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, report that the top 10 percent of households hold about 67.2 percent […]

A New Paradigm of Socioeconomic Organization

Reference code: C25-08 Disclosure: The following guest commentary was submitted unsolicited to the publisher. The views expressed are those generated by ChatGPT alone. The commentary is published as received, and its substance has not been edited, revised, or otherwise altered. The commentary was submitted as an example illustrating different fonts. Commons capitalism envisions a world […]

Shared Surplus and Competitive Edge in a CCE

Reference code: C25-07 A commons capitalism entity, or CCE, is built around a different idea of corporate purpose and surplus. The commons corporation at the top of the group keeps and stewards consolidated surplus for the benefit of the enterprise as a whole. Subsidiaries operate as market-facing competitors that chase industry-level performance. This combination creates […]

How Does Commons Capitalism Relate to Capitalism

Reference code: C25-03 To understand Commons Capitalism it helps to begin with a compact analytic sketch of capitalism and then compare that overview directly to the concrete institutional choices of Commons Capitalism (CC). Doing so shows what CC preserves, how it reconfigures key relationships, and how its institutional design reshapes who benefits from economic activity. […]